“Why Do We Read Fiction?”

Robert Penn Warren

Why do we read fiction? The answer is simple. We read it because we like it. And we like it because fiction, as an image of life, stimulates and gratifies our interest in life. But whatever interests may be appealed to by fiction, the special and immediate interest that takes us to fiction is always our interest in a story.

A story is not merely an image of life, but of life in motion—specifically, the presentation of individual characters moving through their particular experiences to some end that we may accept as meaningful. And the experience that is characteristically presented in a story is that of facing a problem, a conflict. To put it bluntly: no conflict, no story.

It is no wonder that conflict should be at the center of fiction, for conflict is at the center of life. But why should we, who have the constant and often painful experience of conflict in life and who yearn for inner peace and harmonious relation with the outer world, turn to fiction, which is the image of conflict? The fact is that our attitude toward conflict is ambivalent. If we do find a totally satisfactory adjustment in life, we tend to sink into the drowse of the accustomed. Only when our surroundings—or we ourselves—become problematic again do we wake up and feel that surge of energy which is life. And life more abundantly lived is what we seek.

So we, at the same time that we yearn for peace, yearn for the problematic. The adventurer, the sportsman, the gambler, the child playing hide-and-seek, the teen-age boys choosing up sides for a game of sandlot baseball, the old grad cheering in the stadium—we all, in fact, seek out or create problematic situations of greater or lesser intensity. Such situations give us a sense of heightened energy, of life. And fiction, too, gives us that heightened awareness of life, with all the fresh, uninhibited opportunity to vent the rich emotional charge—tears, laughter, tenderness, sympathy, hate, love, and irony—that is stored up in us and short-circuited in the drowse of the accustomed. Furthermore, this heightened awareness can be more fully relished now, because what in actuality would be the threat of the problematic is here tamed to mere imagination, and because some kind of resolution of the problem is, owing to the very nature of fiction, promised.

The story promises us a resolution, and we wait in suspense to learn how things will come out. We are in suspense, not only about what will happen, but even more about what the event will mean. We are in suspense about the story in fiction because we are in suspense about another story far closer and more important to us—the story of our own life as we live it. We do not know how that story of our own life is going to come out. We do not know what it will mean. So, in that deepest suspense of life, which will be shadowed in the suspense we feel about the story in fiction, we turn to fiction for some slight hint about the story in the life we live. The relation of our life to the fictional life is what, in a fundamental sense, takes us to fiction.

Even when we read, as we say, to "escape," we seek to escape not from life but to life, to a life more satisfying than our own drab version. Fiction gives us an image of life—sometimes of a life we actually have and like to dwell on, but often and poignantly of one we have had but do not
have now, or one we have never had and can never have. The ardent fisherman, when his rheumatism keeps him housebound, reads stories from Field and Stream. The baseball fan reads You Know Me, Al, by Ring Lardner. The little coed, worrying about her snub nose and her low mark in Sociology 2, dreams of being a debutante out of F. Scott Fitzgerald; and the thin-chested freshman, still troubled by acne, dreams of being a granite-jawed Neanderthal out of Mickey Spillane. When the Parthians in 53 B.C. beat Crassus, they found in the baggage of Roman officers some very juicy items called Milesian Tales, by a certain Aristides of Miletus; and I have a friend who, in A.D. 1944, supplemented his income as a GI by reading aloud Forever Amber, by a certain Kathleen Winsor, to buddies who found that the struggle over three-syllable words somewhat impaired their dedication to that improbable daydream.

And that is what, for all of us, fiction in one sense, is—a daydream. It is, in other words, an imaginative enactment. In it we find, in imagination, not only the pleasure of recognizing the world we know and of reliving our past, but also the pleasure of entering worlds we do not know and of experimenting with experiences which we deeply crave but which the limitations of life, the fear of consequences, or the severity of our principles forbid to us. Fiction can give us this pleasure without any painful consequences, for there is no price tag on the magic world of imaginative enactment. But fiction does not give us only what we want; more importantly, it may give us things we hadn't even known we wanted.

The daydream that is fiction differs from the ordinary daydream in being publicly available. This fact leads to consequences. In the private daydream you remain yourself—though nobler, stronger, more fortunate, more beautiful than in life. But when the little freshman settles cozily with his thriller by Mickey Spillane, he finds that the granite-jawed hero is not named Slim Willett, after all—as poor Slim, with his thin chest, longs for it to be. And Slim’s college instructor, settling down to For Whom the Bell Tolls, finds sadly that this other college instructor, who is the hero of the famous tale of sleeping bags, bridge demolition, tragic love, and lonely valor, is named Robert Jordan.

How often have we heard some sentimental old lady say of a book: "I just loved the heroine—I mean I just went through everything with her and I knew exactly how she felt. Then when she died I just cried." The sweet old lady, even if she isn't very sophisticated, is instinctively playing a double game: She identifies herself with the heroine, but she survives the heroine’s death to shed the delicious tears. So even the old lady knows how to make the most of what we shall call her role taking. She knows that doubleness, in the very act of identification, is of the essence of role taking: There is the taker of the role and there is the role taken. And fiction is, in imaginative enactment, a role taking.

Role taking not only stems from but also affirms the life process. It is, for instance, at the very center of children's play. This is the beginning of the child's long process of adaptation to others. It is only by role taking that the child comes to know, to know "inwardly" in the only way that finally counts, that other people really exist and are, in fact, persons with needs, hopes, fears, and even rights. And this discipline in sympathy, through the imaginative enactment of role taking, gratifies another need deep in us; our yearning to enter and feel at ease in the human community.
But all along the way, role taking leads us, by the same token, to an awareness of ourselves; it
leads us, in fact, to the creation of the self. All our submerged selves, the old desires and
possibilities, are lurking deep in us, sleepless and eager to have another go. Fiction, most often
in subtly disguised forms, liberatingly reenacts for us such inner conflict. We feel the pleasure of
liberation even when we cannot specify the source of the pleasure.

When in Thackeray’s Vanity Fair the girl Becky Sharp, leaving school for good, tosses her copy
of Dr. Johnson's Dictionary out of the carriage, something in our own heart leaps gaily up, just as
something rejoices at her later sexual and pecuniary adventures in Victorian society, and
suffers, against all our sense of moral justice, when she comes a cropper. When we read
Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, something in our nature participates in the bloody deed,
and later, something else in us experiences, with the murdered Raskolnikov, the bliss of
repentance and reconciliation.

The knowledge in such confrontations does not come to us with intellectual labels. We don’t
say, "Gosh, I’ve got 15 percent of sadism in me"—or 13 percent of unsuspected human charity.
No, the knowledge comes as enactment; and as imaginative enactment, to use our old phrase,
it comes as knowledge. It comes, rather, as a heightened sense of being, as the conflict in the
story evokes the conflict in ourselves, evokes it with some hopeful sense of meaningful
resolution, and with, therefore, an exhilarating sense of freedom.

But in the process of imaginative enactment we have, in another way, that sense of freedom
that comes from knowledge. The image that fiction presents is purged of the distractions,
confusions, and accidents of ordinary life. We can now gaze at the inner logic of things—of a
personality, of the consequences of an act or a thought, of a social or historical situation, of a
lived life. One of our deepest cravings is to find logic in experience, but in real life how little of
our experience comes to us in such a manageable form!

If a child—or a man—who is in a state of blind outrage at his fate can come to understand that
the fate which had seemed random and gratuitous is really the result of his own previous
behavior or is part of the general pattern of life, his emotional response is modified by that
intellectual comprehension. What is intellectually manageable is, then, more likely to be
emotionally manageable. Insofar as a piece of fiction is original and not merely a conventional
repetition of the known and predictable, it is a movement through the "unknowable" toward the
"knowable"—the imaginatively knowable. It says the "unsayable."

We see the logic of the enacted process, and we also see the logic of the end. Not only do we
have now, as readers, the freedom that leads to a knowledge of the springs of action; we have
also the more difficult freedom that permits us to contemplate the consequences of action and
the judgment that may be passed on it. Where the price tag is only that of imaginative
involvement, we can accept judgment. We are reconciled to the terrible necessity of judgment--
upon our surrogate self in the story, our whipping boy and scapegoat. We find a moral freedom
in this fact that we recognize a principle of justice, with also perhaps some gratification of the
paradoxical desire to suffer.
It may be objected here that we speak as though all stories were stories of crime and punishment. No, but all stories, from the gayest farce to the grimmest tragedy, are stories of action and consequence—which amounts to the same thing. All stories, as we have said, are based on conflict; and the resolution of the fictional conflict is, in its implications, a judgment too, a judgment of values. In the end some shift of values has taken place. Some new awareness has dawned, some new possibility of attitude has been envisaged.

We feel, in the end, some sense of reconciliation with the world and with ourselves. And this process of moving through conflict to reconciliation is an echo of our own life process. The life process, as we know it from babyhood on, from our early relations with our parents on to our adult relation with the world, is a long process of conflict and reconciliation. This process of enriching and deepening experience is a pattern of oscillation—a pattern resembling that of the lovers’ quarrel: When lovers quarrel, each asserts his special ego against that of the beloved and then in the moment of making up finds more keenly than before the joy of losing the self in the love of another. So in fiction we enter imaginatively a situation of difficulty and estrangement—a problematic situation that, as we said earlier, sharpens our awareness of life—and move through it to a reconciliation which seems fresh and sweet.

Reconciliation—that is what we all, in some depth of being, want. All religion, all philosophy, all psychiatry, all ethics involve this human fact. And so does fiction. If fiction begins in daydream, if it springs from the cramp of the world, if it relieves us from the burden of being ourselves, it ends, if it is good fiction and we are good readers, by returning us to the world and to ourselves. It reconciles us with reality.

Let us pause to take stock. Thus far what we have said sounds as though fiction were a combination of opium addiction, religious conversion without tears, a home course in philosophy, and the poor man's psycho-analysis. But it is not; it is fiction.

The story, in the fictional sense, is not something that exists of and by itself, out in the world like a stone or a tree. The materials of stories—certain events or characters, for example—may exist out in the world, but they are not fictionally meaningful to us until a human mind has shaped them. We are, in other words, like the princess in one of Hans Christian Andersen's tales; she refuses her suitor when she discovers that the bird with a ravishing son he has offered as a token of love is only a real bird after all. We, like the princess, want an artificial bird—an artificial bird with a real song. So we go to fiction because it is a created thing.

Because it is created by a man, it draws us, as human beings, by its human significance. To begin with, it is an utterance, in words. No words, no story. This seems a fact so obvious, and so trivial, as not to be worth the saying, but it is of fundamental importance in the appeal fiction has for us. We are creatures of words, and if we did not have words we would have no inner life. Only because we have words can we envisage and think about experience. We find our human nature through words. So in one sense we may say that insofar as the language of the story enters into the expressive whole of the story we find the deep satisfaction, conscious or unconscious, of a fulfillment of our very nature.
As with language, so with the other aspects of a work of fiction. Everything there--the proportioning of plot, the relations among the characters, the logic of motivation, the speed or retardation of the movement--is formed by a human mind into what it is, into what, if the fiction is successful, is an expressive whole, a speaking pattern, a form. And in recognizing and participating in this form, we find a gratification, though often an unconscious one, as fundamental as any we have mentioned.

We get a hint of the fundamental nature of this gratification in the fact that among primitive peoples decorative patterns are developed long before the first attempts to portray the objects of nature, even those things on which the life of the tribe depended. The pattern images a rhythm of life and intensifies the tribesman's sense of life.

Or we find a similar piece of evidence in psychological studies made of the response of children to comic books. "It is not the details of development," the researchers tell us, "but rather the general aura which the child finds fascinating." What the child wants is the formula of the accelerating build-up of tension followed by the glorious release when the righteous Superman appears just in the nick of time. What the child wants, then, is a certain "shape" of experience. Is his want, at base, different from our own?

At base, no. But if the child is satisfied by a nearly abstract pattern for the feelings of tension and release, we demand much more. We, too, in the build and shape of experience, catch the echo of the basic rhythm of our life. But we know that the world is infinitely more complicated than the child thinks. We, unlike the child, must scrutinize the details of development, the contents of life and of fiction. So the shaping of experience to satisfy us must add to the simplicity that satisfies the child something of the variety, roughness, difficulty, subtlety, and delight which belongs to the actual business of life and our response to it. We want the factual richness of life absorbed into the pattern so that content and form are indistinguishable in one expressive flowering in the process that John Dewey says takes "life and experience in all its uncertainties, mystery, doubt, and half-knowledge and turns that experience upon itself to deepen and intensify its own qualities." Only then will it satisfy our deepest need--the need of feeling our life to be, in itself, significant.

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